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CRIMINAL LAW AND TECHNOLOGY:
SOME COMMENTS
Monroe E. Price*
Since Comments permit the leisure and casual opportunity to
raise important questions without the obligations inherent in an
article of answering them, I have chosen this art form to discuss
some of the implications for the legal system of the massive invest-
ments in technological change likely to be made on behalf of the
nation's law enforcement authorities. The issue has become partic-
ularly topical in light of the federal cornucopia opened by the
Safe Streets Act.'
A recent book edited by S. A. Yefsky, Law Enforcement
Science and Technology,2 provides a verbal photograph of the
technocop pioneers. In brief, the book is a visit into the world of
paraphernalia and heavy equipment; it bristles with secret formulae
and electric vibrations. It is massive and ambitious, and it betrays
a view of the technology of urban possibilities which is rarely pro-
vided lawyers. As a secret guide to potential police practices, it is
to the new world of surveillance and technology what Inbau and
Reid3 were to the old world of interrogation. And since the confer-
ence where the papers were given was a trade show, there is a
candid lack of deception. It is like an electrical suppliers' meeting
at the Greenbrier Hotel in Virginia where the participants can plot
what they want and hope that no one is listening.
Just as there was a long fight to import rules of proper be-
havior into the custodial setting, this book should be a harbinger of
arduous efforts to establish guidelines in the pre-arrest zone. One
reason for this is that in the new world of Yefsky there will be
much less of the old-style arrest, interrogation and trial. Early
intervention will be much more preventative; evidence gathering
will be sufficiently advanced to foreclose the need for intensive
interrogation; and guilt or innocence will be so clear that a cum-
* Acting Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles.
1 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351
(June 19, 1968).
2 FIRST NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON LAW ENFORCEMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
LAW ENFORCEMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (S. A. Yefsky ed. 1967) [hereinafter
cited as LAw ENFORCEMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY]. See also Wills, The Second
Civil War, EsQUIRE, March 1968, at 71.
1 F. INBAU & J. REI, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (2d ed. 1967).
CRIMINAL LAW AND TECHNOLOGY
bersome fact-determining trial will be superfluous. Indeed, in many
circumstances, such as incipient riots, police will view their task as
intervening in such a way that a formal adversary process with
review by magistrate, judge and jury never results.
There is an impulse to plead distress at the possibility of such
vastly different rules: to say that there is something bad, wrong,
sad and diseased about even discussing the need for such devices
as the "Balanced Transmission Line Security System" designed to
"detect the presence of human intruders within a narrow protected
corridor."4 It is the impulse, to some extent, that Justice Douglas
yielded to in his dissent in Osborn v. United States,5 where, as
Biblical prophet, he declaimed: "We are rapidly entering the age
of no privacy, where everyone is open to surveillance at all times."6
The prophetic role is an important one, but it is not necessarily the
role at which lawyers are best. Lawyers have a more specific func-
tion, namely, to assist in the development of rational public debate
through the discovery of unarticulated issues susceptible of legal
formulation.
One reason it is important to develop some legal arguments to
buttress or discriminate is that too much of the current discussion
results from headlines and hysterics. On the one hand this is the
fruit of the rise in reported crime rates; on the other it is fear of
the consequences of acceleration in new technology in police equip-
ment. By and large, conversation about these matters has been
heavily policy-oriented in an unshaped and polarizing way: Is it
prudent to use Mace rather than guns (or nothing)? Is it too
Orwellian to have body-sensing devices as an aid to the solution of
bank robberies? Do we approach a police state when there is
closed circuit television in Central Park? These are good questions
worthy of debate. But posing issues in this way does not draw on
the expertise of law and lawyers to develop boundaries for appro-
priate conduct. As in the area of eavesdropping and wiretapping, it
will shortly be necessary for lawyers to adapt ancient doctrine to
these new departures. Somehow, some time, the permissibility of
these police techniques will be brought before a judge who will
have to use his creaky common-law and constitutional vocabulary
to render judgment. It will not be sufficient to engage in condem-
natory rhetoric; sentiment must be supplemented by reasoned analy-
sis.
4 Trimble, The Balanced Transmission Line Security System (BTL), in LAW
ENFORCEMENT SCIENCE AND TECNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 883.
385 U.S. 323, 340 (1966).
6 Id. at 341.
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Furthermore, such analysis must go beyond the kinds of ques-
tions lawyers usually raise concerning limits on the constitutional
power of the state to use various kinds of weapons. It must include
some analysis of the effects on society resulting from a massive
increase in the commitment of money toward the prevention of
crime and the apprehension of offenders. This comment will explore
primarily this latter problem in the context of the new technology.
In the succeeding paragraphs, the following areas are explored:
first, what effect does massive capital investment in law enforce-
ment have on the current relationship between procedural safeguards
and substantive rules; second, what effect do these budgetary de-
cisions have on the meaning of particular criminal laws; third,
what is the effect of the financial commitment to law enforcement
and security on public opinion generally, and what relationship
is there between changed public opinion and jury trials; and finally,
what is the effect of an increased possibility of enforcement on our
need for a pock-marked, rickety criminal process?
I. THE RELATION BETWEEN PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
AND SUBSTANTIVE RULES
Our regular understanding has been that procedural protec-
tions, such as the familiar constitutional provisions dealing with
unreasonable searches and seizures, the right to counsel, and the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, are something apart
from the rules for behavior that are characterized as "substantive."
Yet the procedural harness on government behavior has rendered
it more difficult for the state to enforce its laws.7 The building of
procedural guarantees often means that the government will not be
allowed to apply the public standard of criminality wherever and
whenever that standard is violated. There are vast areas of crimi-
nality-certain morals offenses and gambling come to mind-where
the government has been sapped of power by the strictures against
unconstitutional searches and seizures.
Despite our frequent pretense, then, there is an intimate re-
lationship between procedural safeguards and the power of the
government to set rules for conduct. To some extent, this was the
argument of Justice Harlan in urging that the anti-contraception
statutes of Connecticut be struck down. In his dissent in Poe v. Ull-
man,' he listed the methods that the police would have to employ
in obtaining evidence, suggesting obliquely that it would be difficult
7 See Packer, Two Models oj the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1964).
8 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961).
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to investigate for violations of the law without trenching on recog-
nized constitutional rights. Let us say that the purport of Justice
Harlan's view is that there can be no statute which the state is
unable to enforce at all because of constitutional obstacles. The
Frankfurterian concept of desuetude is similar, implying some con-
nection between the validity of a law and the frequency of its
invocation.' The Frankfurter-Harlan doctrine seems to imply that
a state may not be able to pass the ten commandments merely for
in terrorem rather than enforcement purposes.
The question put by the new technology is more difficult: Jus-
tice Harlan's view may be characterized as saying that the legis-
lature cannot pass a statute which may not be enforced at all; on
the other hand, is there a defensible position which would render
it wrong for a state to enforce the legislative mandate completely?
The claim of certain manufacturers is that their devices will lead
to the apprehension and conviction of all persons who violate certain
rules.'" Partly this invites an inquiry into legislative intent: Did
the legislature assume, when it passed a statute, that procedural
obstacles or lack of ability would yield only token enforcement of
the law-enough to keep the rule vital, but not so much as to ter-
rorize the citizenry? In tax fraud prosecutions, for example, there
is a perceived need for symbolic prosecutions immediately before
April 15, but a vigorous enforcement program involving a large
percentage of violaters would encounter significant opposition. That
was Thurman Arnold's experience as a crusading Assistant Attorney
General attempting to enforce the Clayton Act.
The effect of the new technology on the balance between pro-
cedural safeguards and substantive rules is felt most clearly in the
wholesale increase in the capacity to gather information which
would otherwise not be obtained because of constitutional obstacles.
Technology which remarkably improves detection and identification
has that result. Consensual offenses, certain morals crimes, and
anti-gambling laws become more Damoclean because evidence is
easier to gather. In the past, the halting ability of government to
intervene in certain situations without violating constitutional
safeguards served as a curb on rule-enforcement. To the extent that
9 For an interesting discussion see Rodgers & Rodgers, Desuetude as a Defense,
52 IowA L. Rv. 1 (1966).
10 A distinction will be necessary between crimes where discretion is important,
e.g., anti-riot offenses, and those where discretion may be less: important, e.g.,
robberies. It may be that the power of devices to say who has committed the act of
an offense will be limited to crimes where discretion is a less relevant consideration.
That would be a happier state of affairs. But perhaps such a division does not exist
and perhaps the discretion-machine match will not be perfect.
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the new technology permits the government to avoid traditional
constitutional strictures, the substantive rule takes on a different
meaning. It becomes, so to speak, more intensive: the rule has more
impact than was previously the case. We must pay more attention
to the rule because it is now easier to enforce.
The availability of technological devices will make us decide
and articulate whom we really want arrested, a decision that the
society may not be willing to make without surfacing unpleasant
and arbitrary aspects of police discretion. For example, there will
certainly be an improvement of the radar devices for detecting an
automobile travelling in excess of the speed limit which would al-
low the determination of guilt and assessment of fine to be almost
automatic. If any car exceeded the speed limit, the automobile's
device would report it to a computer which would issue a citation.
It is perfect law enforcement. It would mean, I think, that the
legislature would have to revise the substantive rules. Another ex-
ample: What if, as is technologically possible, each citizen Were
required to wear an invisible set of numbers (much like the visible
ones now imposed on his automobile), which would be sensible to
alarm. Lengthy investigations and guesswork could be eliminated.
The problems are similar to the problem of general electronic spying.
Such surveillance is "short" of a search and therefore struggles to
be free of the procedural limitations on the power of the police to
search." Technology is attractive in part because it frees law en-
forcement from the entanglements of procedural niceties. The sur-
veillance devices are the search and seizure equivalent of various
registration obligations. 2 The convenience of law enforcement
authorities is served by forcing the citizen to unshield and expose
evidence of a crime. Just as registration requirements soften the
impact of the fifth amendment, capital improvements-machinery
additions-change the balance of the fourth.
Complete surveillance-the capacity for more or less complete
enforcement-does not, of course, mean that complete enforcement
will take place. Information does not have to lead to action; the
police may decide not to arrest, the prosecutor may decide not to
charge; the grand jury may decide not to indict. But the flexibility
is lessened greatly when information is so freely available. At pres-
ent, the great freedom of law enforcement agencies is to decide how
11 See Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street" Detention, Questioning
and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in General, 51 J.
Carm. L.C. & P.S. 381 (1960); Comment, Constitutional Limitations on Pre-Arrest
Investigations, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1031 (1968).
712 See, e.g., Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
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to allocate limited investigatory resources. If that flexibility van-
ishes, freedom to determine what cases to prosecute will be sharply
affected. Two opposing groups may favor this possibility. For the
police who, among others, sometimes claim the inability to see the
subtle distinction between what the legislature says and what it
means, the ideal of complete enforcement seems only natural. For
people troubled about prosecutorial discretion and low visibility
police decisions, complete enforcement may also be an excellent
change. Singling out of defendants becomes less likely as information
which is determinative becomes more accessible. Besides, the re-
quirement of complete enforcement may precipitate a crisis in
state intervention which leads to a thorough re-thinking of the
criminal process. Correction practices would be reassessed if vast
numbers of citizens were routinely incarcerated. Substantive crimes
would be modified because of the new disability to restrict their bite
(more or less) to the poor and uninfluential.
The second way in which the balance between procedure and
substance is affected is, perhaps, more sinister. By making law
enforcement more capital intensive the government will be able to
alter the ratio between criminal dispositions without trial and dis-
positions pursuant to full criminal proceedings. Indeed, a likely
result is a system where a larger percentage of "dispositions" almost
completely avoids the judicial and administrative process through
enhanced police actions which are designed to do far more than
identify and detain a suspect. There is some evidence that a new
strategy of law enforcement agencies, buttressed by new technologi-
cal capabilities, is to intervene not with an eye to arrest, but with
an eye to disable and, sometimes, to inflict punishment." Tear gas
and Mace fall within this category. When Mace is administered to
a crowd, the police may lose interest in initiating the sophisticated
process (through an arrest) of discovering whether or not their
intervention was warranted. By this strategy, a conscious decision,
the law enforcement officials may decide to minimize arrests, at the
same time fulfilling the goals of punishment-deterrence, rehabili-
tation and perhaps retribution-by their independently arrived at
penalties. While the process-avoiding tendency has always existed,
the addition of sophisticated machinery makes it more troublesome.
II. BUDGET ALLOCATION AND THE MEANING OF LAW
What I have just discussed is the relationship between the
"meaning" of a substantive rule and the procedural climate in which
13 Cf. Comment, Judicial Control of the Riot Curfew, 77 YAz L.J. 1560 (1968).
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that rule is enforced. Effective restrictions on police surveillance
change the intensity of a rule. But there is a second important
manner in which the introduction of expensive law enforcement
devices changes the meaning of a law. If the system of creating
and enforcing rules were rational, one way in which we would know
what a law means is by ascertaining how much a society sets aside
in terms of budget for its implementation. This is not true only of
criminal laws, but of various types of legislation. For example, Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 4 forbade discriminatory practices
in employment and promotion. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, which was established to administer Title VII and to
determine the validity of thousands of claims, was drastically under-
financed. With a skeletal force it was only capable of performing a
small portion of the chore Congress had set out. No one doubts that
the measuring of money was quite deliberate and that Congress was
expressing with great clarity something about the law which it had
enacted. The law was, of course, to be a moral statement; a standard
for conduct established by the legislature. But that was not all
Congress was saying. To those who were listening carefully (and
that included potential violators), it also suggested (a) that either
it did not mean fully what it said (the law should not be taken at
face value), or (b) that Congress was willing to let the moral force
of the statute be its principal source of strength. There are, then,
various ways in which a legislature or an executive can state the
intensity of a statutory norm and one of these ways is through
the budgeting process.
To be sure, law enforcement budgets are not normally allocated
to a particular rule (as in the case of Title VII where the intensity
declaration is unusually manifest); rather they are given to police
departments as a whole. 5 However, the police department must
determine internally how to allocate funds; it must normally propose
a budget to the appropriating council and in that budget suggest
how money is being spent. An example of the process is a federal
statute which makes it a crime for anyone who speaks or writes
threats "to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon" the
President.' In fiscal year 1963, 80 arrests were made under this
section; in 1964, about 100; in 1965, about 200; and in 1966, there
were 400 arrests. While the rise was obviously attributable in part
to a tide of anti-administration feeling, this increase in arrests was
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
15 There are some exceptions, such as state and federal narcotics bureaus which
are separately financed partly because of the "importance" of the subject.
16 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1964).
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also attributable to an increase in the size of the Secret Service, as
recommended by the Warren Commission in 1964. The staff of the
Secret Service increased from 350 to 575 during the period reflected
in the statistics just cited.' 7 One perspective for studying the rise
in the arrest rate under this statute is to say that the law is "meant"
more intensely now by the government than it was in 1963. The
increase in intensity is reflected by an increase in the budget,
though the expenditures take the form of an accretion in manpower
rather than an improvement in technology.
The relationship between budget allocations and the "meaning"
of the statute takes on a special significance where the substantive
rule is passed by a state legislature and local communities make the
capital investment decisions. While that has frequently been the
case, when capital decisions become much more important the
gulf between the original law-making process (by the state legis-
lature) and the law-enforcing process (by the locality) takes on
greater significance. In a sense, the legislature will be passing a
complete set of rules, leaving it up to the local community to de-
cide through the budgeting of funds which statute should be
enforced and with what thoroughness.
Since this has generally been the process, one might ask what
special difference there is in the opportunity for large capital outlays.
Just as the increase in capital investment, coupled with' a decrease
in prosecutorial discretion, forces a clearer articulation of who
should be arrested, the budgeting of greater bulk sums of money
forces a clearer articulation of which crimes should be enforced.
Policemen, more particularly old-style non-tactical policemen, were
more or less fungible-movable into different kinds of details.
But when a community decides to buy a tank or quantities of
Mace or electric prods or closed circuit television systems, it is
making costly, often single function, decisions. The community is
more clearly required to state its priorities.
What this suggests is that there is a dimension to criminal
statutes which has rarely been discussed.' 8 Absent information
17 All these figures are taken from a newspaper article by Fred P. Graham. See
Graham, Arrest For Threats to the President Up Sharply Since The Assassination,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1968, § 1, at 59, col. 1.
18 It is possible, however, to view the criticism of the late Robert F. Kennedy's
prosecution of Hoffa in this light. Even though everything that the Attorney-General
did was "very constitutional," see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 78, 80 (1967) (Stewart,
J., dissenting), still, there was an over-dedication of resources in a way not fitting to
the intensity with which the law was "meant." No one minds the diversion of a
great bulk of FBI agents to track down the killer of Martin Luther King; somehow,
that is a more suitable allocation in terms of the meaning of a statute.
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about the muscle behind a statute, it is not possible to describe
accurately the rule of behavior it dictates. A statute means not only
what it says, but also the force behind the statement. Thus, in
California before 1967, a statute which seemingly forbade abortion
in all circumstances was not enforced when the abortion took place
in proper hospitals under the supervision of "ethical" doctors. Be-
fore a new policy was initiated by Governor Winthrop Rockefeller
of Arkansas, a statute of that state which proscribed gambling had
to be read as not applying to Hot Springs, since gambling flourished
there openly along with the connivance of law enforcement author-
ities and state officials.
I do not mean to imply that a statute without a budget is
meaningless; that the mere statement of a standard has no moral
or deterrent force. That would be too unkind a characterization of
the citizenry. Surely, there would be some compliance with parking
ordinances even if drivers knew that the government had not been
able to provide enforcement officials to cite violators of the law.
And violators are not blameless merely because the government
does not have the resources to prosecute. All I am suggesting is that
the citizen may be acting understandably if he includes in his scale
of values some assessment of the extent to which the government
intends to enforce compliance with a given standard. 9
The dual quality of a criminal statute's meaning-first its
definition and then its intensity-has important implications for
the argument for technology. Proponents of massive change in the
technical capabilities of law enforcement normally suggest that
fulfillment of their objectives will not alter the community's rules,
they will only improve enforcement. What I have tried to indicate,
however, is that the extent of investment in enforcement may be a
significant aspect of the rule itself. Substantial changes in capability,
whether labor intensive or capital intensive, must be viewed as sub-
stantial changes in the system. The change may be for the better
or for the worse, but it is a change nonetheless. The problem is
particularly complicated where the appropriating or budgeting
agency is separate from the body that sets the norms. Where such
bifurcation exists, the rule-making body loses substantial control
19 In part, the role of a budget in assessing the intensity-meaning of a statute
may depend on the peculiar practice of the jurisdiction. There have been suggestions
that England, in comparison with various states in the United States, is far more
reluctant to characteriie conduct as criminal; once the characterization is made,
there is an immediate stigma attached to the proscribed behavior. In jurisdictions
where there is a much greater facility to call conduct criminal as one of the first
responses, the community may develop political techniques to become sensitive to
the importance of the rule.
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over the intensity aspect of its definition. It cannot allocate law
enforcement resources in a way which reflects its varying ardor
for the criminal norms established.
III. PUBLIC OPINION, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE
RIGHT To TRIAL BY JURY
In addition to its influence on the relationship between sub-
stantive rules and procedural due process, technology may have a
significant impact on public attitudes-and thus on jury attitudes
towards suspects. Before treating the Sheppard20 aspects, a tech-
nology analogy may be useful. It is no longer solely within the
province of a radical fringe to discuss the existence and influence of
a vast military-industrial establishment on American foreign policy.
Through techniques which are quite natural and expected, public
attitudes are shaped, appropriations are fostered, and the idea of
international danger is encouraged to persist. There are questions,
on the crudest level, of jobs and dislocations in the American econ-
omy. On a more refined plane, there are problems in education and
self-image--the difference, say, in voting that exists if citizens see
themselves beleaguered in a hostile world which is constantly slip-
ping into powerful and aggressive hands. The incredible technology
of war, with massive investments and with tremendous new popu-
lation arrangements, must be accompanied by a change in feelings,
a change in the way the world is perceived. There have been at-
tempts, of course, to chart what differences it all makes; how it
affects the likelihood of war, or the chances for peace. What is
agreed is that it surely affects the attitude of our citizenry.
There is a possibility of the same sequence occurring in the
environment of technology and our domestic war. To be sure, the
fact that the nice people at Rand and IDA are working on problems
of crime in our cities will not mean that strange forces will be un-
leashed among our legislators. But the polite technologists are not
the salesmen. The danger begins when the men who earn commis-
sions by selling the devices, costing immense amounts, begin going
from city to city seeking to have the machinery purchased. For
sales to occur there will have to be a perceived need for large
increases in the budget for law enforcement, just as changed atti-
tudes were necessary before the federal government would double
and redouble the defense budget.2 The Yefsky book is typical:
20 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
21 For an example of such an attempt to change attitudes see Appendix infra.
Mr. Victor Palmieri, Deputy Executive Director of the National Advisory
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overblown and motley with a lot of tired speeches where the
pushers for defense sales did not bother to modify their work ex-
cept to provide a different technological patina and much clanking
of swords.
In large part what the promoters of the new technology of
law enforcement deal in is snake oil: they are munitions makers
1970 style who have learned the way to sell to the Pentagon and
then turn the technique on law enforcement pushing. Basically,
there are two styles. The first is the Music Man approach:
you've got trouble, right here in River City with a capital T.22
In this case it is an alarming crime rate that is soaring, jumping,
enveloping, engrossing. Murders are up from 30,000 to 40,000;
nonfelonious unreported crimes have multiplied by some appropriate
factor related to the number of dollars the supplier thinks ate
available in the city. After the announcement of the crisis, the
Music Man approach implies that there is a reasonable, not too
expensive, technique for cutting the crime rate right down to
nothing. It could be helicopters, flying at 65 feet seeing what
concentrations of money people have in their wallets (through a
special sensory device). It might be an electronic fence, like the
McNamera line. It might be a handy little solid-state transistor
radio gadget, only $20 and if you get one each for your 10,000
police you will have a safe city.
The second approach, which first caught on domestically in
the organized crime area but has been with us in international
relations for a long time, is the Fight Fire with Fire approach.2"
Here the huckster tells you what the enemy has: it might be zip
guns, dope, poison gas, bugging devices, trigger men, computers,
walkie-talkie radios, etc. Now, do you want your side to be without
all that modern equipment that the enemy has? Criminals have
been becoming much more sophisticated, the argument goes, while
Commission on Civil Disorders, suggested in an interview that a major reason for
advancing the publication of that Commission's Report was to dampen the enthusiasm
of local law enforcement agencies and communities to invest massively in certain
types of the new technology. See Jones, Timing of Riot Report Called Great Life
Saver, L.A. Times, Nov. 10, 1968, § C, at 1, col. 5.
22 See, e.g., Fuss, Modern Commercial and Industrial Security and Intrusion
Detection Alarm Systems, in LAW ENFORCEMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra
note 2, at 817; Holzmann, The Potential of Chemical Surveillance in Law Enforce-
ment, in LAW ENFORCEMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 357, 361;
Soldan, Innovation in Personal Radio Equipped Police, in LAW ENFORCEMENT
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 159, 168; Watts, Access Control System
for Vehicle Security, in LAW ENFORCEMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2,
at 927.
23 This argument is frequently used to justify wiretapping and eavesdropping
devices.
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our police are still the same old Irish buffoons, knocking people
over the head with nightsticks while the "enemy" is employing the
double whammy.
There are several other approaches in Yefsky, primarily be-
cause of its aerospace orientation. One is so trite that it has been
discarded in almost every selling campaign except politics and
crime: the Moon Analogy. "If we can put a man on the moon, then
surely we can lick the problems of slum housing, win a pennant
for the New York Mets, clear the air of Los Angeles, provide a
quart of milk for every Hottentot."2 If we can get a man on the
moon by 1970, the argument goes, surely we should be able to
protect our wives from getting raped. The answer is probably yes
if our wives wear space suits all the time. The grand ploy of them
all is "the capability we are developing in Vietnam."2 We are
learning there to deal with guerilla warfare; we are learning there
about insurrectionists and terrorists; we are learning there how
to tell which men who pose as innocent fishermen in the daytime
are the dread enemy at night. The problems of the DMZ are, after
all, like those of Detroit. The enemy is hard to find, hard to iden-
tify.
As Keith L. Warn of North American Aviation puts it so
well in Yefsky's collection:
The technological and tactical problems of military and law enforce-
ment agencies are similar in many aspects .... The technical and
tactical aspects of marking and identifying the farmer-by-day guerilla-
by-night in Vietnam are very similar to those involved in marking and
identifying the agent-provocateur who, after inciting a riot, disappears
before police reinforcements arrive. 26
The law enforcement official is assigned the tasks of protecting
his city or jurisdictional entity from the criminal element; the
military man must protect his establishment from insurgents, sab-
oteurs, and infiltrators.
The most important new products involve the under-the-bed
syndrome. There is beginning to be--on a massive scale-the kind
of preoccupation with intruders that homely spinsters lying on their
beds are traditionally supposed to have. For them there is bad news
from the Army: "The development of a completely reliable, man-
24 See, e.g., Warn, System Engineering Approach to Law Enforcement, in LAw
ENFORCEMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 651.
25 See id.
26 Id.
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clear from Manfred Gale's article2" in Yefsky that we are probably
sensing device appears to lie in the very distant future" 27 It is
spending more to find a device that will be man-sensing but which
will "exclude stimuli from other sources," than we are spending
on what we do with the man after we have sensed him. The man-
sensing problem is fascinatingly treated in Yefsky. In addition
to the Gale article, there are ten others, by scientists from numerous
companies, trying to palm-off military technology on frightened
civilians. George R. Desi of Westinghouse (Surface Division)
writes about "countermeasures" to conditions of "clandestine at-
tack" and possible approaches for qualitative evaluation of sys-
tem security. 9 Honeywell's representative is of the Music Man
variety: he points out that vandalism and sabotage losses to
retailers alone is running well over two billion dollars per year.8 0
He has a little device which is a photoconductive motion-detector
(price not detected). A. L. Morehead of RCA has a device that
can see in the dark.8'
What does all this have to do with lawyers and law, with
criminal procedure and the Bill of Rights? How does one argue
that a criminal defendant should be released because the equipment
used by the police was too efficient or because the military-industrial
establishment has gotten its dirty fingers involved in law enforce-
ment. Restating the issue will provide some aid: To what extent
should there be concern with the atmosphere in which the criminal
process takes place? Fortunately, there is at least one analogy
that can prove helpful: the matter of press publicity surrounding
a criminal prosecution.
2
While judicial discussion of the impact of publicity has gener-
ally centered on prejudicial news concerning a particular defendant
in a particular case, there are signs that such a narrow perspective
is beginning to corrode and give way to a broader approach. For
the real peril was, and may still be, the pollution of the climate
for criminal trials generally. Just as it was exceedingly tough to
be on trial for a Smith Act violation in the 1950's even if there
27 Gale, Army Physical Security System Development Program, in LAW ENFORCE-
MENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 943, 944.
28 Id. at 943.
29 Desi, An Approach to the Analysis of System Vulnerability to Clandestine
Attack, in LAW ENFORCEMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 805.
80 See Fuss, supra note 22.
81 See Morehead, Low-Light-Level and Non-Visible-Radiation-Sensitive Viewing
Devices for Law Enforcement and Crime Prevention, in LAW ENFORCEMENT SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2, at 827.
82 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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was not a word of publicity about the individual defendant, it is
now extremely tough to be on trial for rape or for riot, because of
general, rather than individual, news coverage. The Reardon Re-
port8 3 and its critics can all be viewed, then, as responding to the
same problem though in different ways: though they speak of
protecting individual defendants, what they are probably most
concerned about is some de-escalation in the walloping impact of
crime coverage on the citizenry whose conduct as jurors is seriously
affected by the press. In short, it may be that a defendant has a
right not only to a jury free from damaging pre-trial information
about him, but also to a jury not inflamed against criminal defen-
dants as a class. 4
This is where the military industrial establishment objection
comes in. Largely because of the immense cost involved, the law
enforcement authorities, together with the suppliers of the new
technology, have an impressive selling job to do. I do not suggest
the working of a sinister conspiracy, merely the normal operation
of the desire to convince the purchaser that he needs your product.
We are all worried about bad breath, so we buy Listerine. That may
be desirable as an aesthetic matter, but it is not dangerous. But if,
because we are all worried about crime, we spend millions and
billions for protection, that may be a different matter. To ensure
that the consumer will continue to spend, the seller must continue
to impress him with the need to spend. And the need here is closely
tied to fear-fear of crime, fear of a rise in crime, fear that the due
process system is not sufficient when coupled with the old sort of
law enforcement machinery. But the fear that will have to be cre-
ated to induce the needed votes for massive law enforcement
budgets may create citizens who are the wrong kind of jurors or at
least jurors who go into the box with a different kind of bias.
IV. HUBRIS AND TECHNOLOGY
There is a final aspect of a more perfect law enforcement
which merits discussion.8" There is something appealing, perhaps
88 AuzmwcAN 3A ASS'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO FREE TRuAL AND FREE PRESS
(i967).
84 1 have developed this thought at somewhat greater length in Price, Book
Review, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1171 (1967).
85 There are certain aspects of the relationship between law enforcement, capital
investment, and the climate of the community which are, happily, beyond the scope
of this comment. I should like to advert to a few in the obscurity of a footnote. (1)
Can the move from city to suburb be viewed, in part, as a capital investment in
security in the law enforcement sense? Certainly real estate agents sometimes take
that position. True, your house payments will go up, and it may take longer to drive
09681
UCLA LAW REVIEW
reassuring, in the knowledge that we do not wholly mean what we
say. Uneven and incomplete law enforcement is partially welcome
because we may have a sense that perhaps the rules passed by
the legislature are not the best of all possible rules. Standards may
be too harsh or may miss the point; the penal or correctional
process may not fulfill any of the goals established for it. 6 It would
be a great deal to ask that we be sure that our rules are appropriate
and just. Keystone Kops provide a cushion of assurance, though
it is an odd one. A rule may be a wrong rule, but we can probably
guess that a careful violator will escape punishment. Should prosti-
tution be illegal? Should homosexuality be proscribed? Is gambling
reprehensible? Is abortion a crime? Should marijuana be indulged?
Those questions can be debated and discussed with less passion in
large part because their practice can occur with only occasional
state intervention. That is not to say that the situation is a happy
one or that those who are arrested can at all be comforted by the
fact that they are few among many; rather it is to say that from a
public instead of an individual view, the fact of incomplete law
enforcement permits us the luxury of continuing statutes which are,
perhaps, not just or appropriate. The massive changes in technology
that may reduce non-enforcement pose a challenge to this luxury.
Absolute enforcement is only desirable where the society is absolutely
confident that the rule it has passed should be observed. But have
we achieved that sort of hubris? 7
to work; municipal services will have to be extended; but after all, you will be
safer. (2) To what extent is the capital loss which flows from discriminatory employ-
ment patterns a reflection of a desire for security? That is, how many employers are
there who buy an all-white labor force, for example, out of fear that the employment
of Negroes will lead to an increase in crime? (3) At a time when municipal services
such as education or parks are generally underfunded, what are the implications of
disproportionate financing of law enforcement activities? In other words, can we
begin to use the international guns or butter rhetoric in the domestic arena? (4) We
already know something of what the heavy investment in law enforcement and
security, at the Presidential level, does to the concept of leadership, to the potency of
the image of American democracy; we should know more, not only at the national
level, but below. The 1968 elections are too grim a reminder of the capacity of "law
enforcement" and security as issues to twist and distort the normal process of
campaigns and debate.
86 See, e.g., CALiFoRNIA AsSEMBLY, OFFICE Or RESEARCH, CRIME AND PENALTIES IN
CALRoaNIA (1968).87it is important to go beyond the idea that we would tolerate perfect enforce-
ment if there were perfect confidence in the condition of our criminal laws, for there
is something else far more subtle at stake. Neither perfect enforcement, nor perfect
prevention may be desirable. Perfect prevention would have the same chilling effect
on thought and conduct which has been found unconstitutional in the first amend-
ment area. Improved detection might push the line between preparation and attempt,
for example, so far back that it causes apprehension and anxiety among that large
mass of the population which includes all of us who, at one time, have considered
and begun a course which might have resulted in criminal conduct. See generally
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APPENDIX
AN ELECTRONIC PROTECTION SYSTEM FOR THE
CITY OF NEWPORT BEACH 88
A growing lawlessness and a consequently rapidly accelerating crime
rate has caused the President to label crime "one of the most serious prob-
lems facing our Nation." Since 1960 crime in these United States has
increased more than 80%. Crime has accelerated from five times popula-
tion growth in the late fifties to seven times population growth in 1967
and the national increase this past year reached 16%. Juvenile crime con-
tinues to be a major problem with more than 40% of serious offenses being
perpetrated by persons under 21 years of age and the age of greatest
criminality is now 15 years.
A Special Study Commission appointed by the President has urged
that new methods and techniques be devised to meet the problem of crime
in our cities. Congress has in both 1965 and 1966 appropriated money to
assist local law enforcement in their innovative efforts with both tech-
nology and procedures that might turn the tide of lawlessness. The Safe
Streets and Crime Bill which would provide some 85 million dollars for
these purposes is now before Congress.
In August of 1967 a proposal was made to the Newport Beach City
Council that our City test a system which would use police monitored
television cameras to provide more safety for our citizens and their prop-
erty. It was further proposed that an application for funds for such project
be made under the Law Enforcement Assistance Act passed by Congress
in 1965 in an amount of approximately a half million dollars. Your City
Council approved an expenditure of $3,500.00 and commissioned the
Santa Ana based Arinc Corporation to assist in the preparation of a grant
application.
Since that action the local press, the press nationally, radio, and tele-
vision have shown a great and varied interest in the proposal. It was
inevitable that controversy should occur. It was also inevitable that a
great deal of misinformation would be disseminated. Some of it was de-
liberate. Not all people in this country desire an effective Law Enforcement
System nor desire a slowdown in our movement toward anarchy.
Fried, Privacy, 77 YAL. L.J. 475 (1968). Second, there is a psychological deprivation
involved in total enforcement of the criminal law. It is not for nothing that our
dream world, our popular novels and our successful motion pictures are filled with
the excitement of the chase, the ingenuity of the police pitted against the ingenuity of
the violator; it is more than coincidence that great escapes are perceived as both
heroic and frightening. Sad as it may seem to those who decry the rising crime rate,
the existence of the opportunity to violate the law and avoid detection is still an
important part of the culture. The question, I suppose, is whether it is a part that is
worth saving.
88 This broadside was distributed by the Newport Beach Police Dep't in
Winter, 1968. It is reprinted because it illustrates some of the points I hoped to make.
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It is important, however, that you (The Newport Beach resident)
become acquainted with what is actually being proposed and how it may
benefit you and your neighbors.
1. This is a test or pilot program and is not a complete system. The
development of 12 to 18 cameras is contemplated, which it is believed
will adequately test the effectiveness and acceptance of the concept.
2. It is planned to use the best engineering talent available in ex-
ploiting the television art and producing a system which will permit
the rapid dispatch of officers to locations of civil disorder, of crime,
and of traffic problems. It is expected also that the system will be
a strong deterrent to crime. Surveillance of areas adjacent to schools,
for example, would discourage the potential child molester and the
social deviate.
3. The cameras will be used exclusively in and focused only on those
areas of our community which are considered public. These are our
beaches, marinas, commercial areas, streets, and thoroughfares. The
equipment should prove of great value in shortening the time of police
response and giving consequent assistance. Swimmers in trouble, the
build-up of traffic congestion, the need for ambulance service, all may
be noted minutes before the first telephone call is received.
4. The cameras will not be trained into homes or buildings.
5. The cameras will not be capable of seeing through walls, drapes,
or other materials which are designed for privacy.
6. The cameras will not have audio capability and consequently will
not have the capacity to overhear conversations.
There are a number of other myths that unfortunately have arisen
and need to be laid away. This is not the first such application of television
for police use. Closed circuit television cameras have been used success-
fully for a number of years in England, Germany and Japan. A number
of American cities presently use them for traffic control. Both private and
public agencies are continuing to find more applications for television use.
The Edison Company uses closed circuit television to monitor their opera-
tion and to provide security for remote power plants. Large merchandis-
ing organizations are using television equipment to discourage shoplifting.
Municipal uses are varied. Television equipment is being used to survey
water reservoirs, power plants, and municipal buildings. Several Orange
County law enforcement agencies are now using portable battery powered
cameras with video tape capability for many field needs. They would un-
doubtedly have come into wider use were it not for the cost factors and
the technological limitations heretofore in existence.
Until a relatively recent date, cameras were ineffective under low
level light conditions. They were particularly sensitive to glare and could
be installed only with cable connections or individual microwave installa-
tions. Much of this has been changed.
Our time in history will be noted for the advances made in electronics.
We therefore believe that the time is particularly propitious for testing
the applicability of this new technology to public protection. It is be-
lieved that the City of Newport Beach offers a unique testing ground
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in that the features of topography, weather, and corrosive atmosphere will
provide a severe test of both equipment and system. The system will
contemplate day and night coverage with video tape capacities where the
preservation of evidence is a factor. It will provide for suitable head-
quarters monitoring and protection of the system against natural hazards
and vandalism. Ease of installation, mobility of video equipment, and low
maintenance cost will be prime considerations.
As presently conceived the City funding of $3,500.00 has permitted
a preliminary study and the development of the grant request. The request
will be submitted under Council authority to the Federal Government or
other Congress designated authority for a system development funding.
Further City cash outlay will in all probability not exceed $10,000 and
will be used for installation costs, such as mounting of cameras and the
providing of electric power to the operating equipment.
Federal contributions, should the grant request be approved, are
expected to amount to some $228,000 in engineering costs and $270,000
in equipment costs. The City of Newport Beach and Arinc Corporation
would be expected to return to the Federal Government a tested and
evaluated systems design together with operating procedures, operating
constraints, legal and ethical interpretations, utility constraints, and oper-
ating cost information. The total development time is projected over a
two year period with equipment becoming available for installation early
in the second year of development.
The test system with a value of perhaps $150,000 will, at the con-
clusion of the test period, become the property of the City, The City
Council will then decide whether to continue use of the system, amplify
or expand the camera network, or dismantle the system and put the equip-
ment to other use.
It should be emphasized that the operation would be under the com-
plete control of the City Council. They would set the constraints deemed
necessary for ethical operation of such a system. Such constraints would
preclude any unwarranted intrusion of the system into the private affairs
of our citizens.
However, the citizen has protection also in the Judiciary. From our
local Municipal and Superior Courts to the Appellate and Supreme Courts
of our State and Nation, we have a "blue-ribbon" committee of learned
experts who are charged to protect the citizen against any unreasonable
invasions of an individual's right to privacy. Other agencies Such as the
Federal Department of Justice and the Federal Communications Commis-
sion would exercise some program controls in order to preclude any un-
toward uses of such a system.
The Federal funds obtained will not carry with them any authority
over either the local police agency or the development of the system. Such
control will continue to rest in your City Council and City Manager.
President Johnson in a message to Congress stated,
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I do not propose that the Federal Government take over the job of
dealing with crime in America's streets. From the birth of the Republic
to the present hour, responsibility for keeping the peace in our cities
has been squarely on the shoulders of local authorities.
Privacy:
Probably the greatest amount of controversy since the system was
proposed has centered around the matter of privacy. It is here that reac-
tions are strong and can be triggered by key words that arouse feelings of
resentment and opposition. Such words are oftentimes deliberately used to
engender and develop such reactions when the facts, if dispassionately set
forth, would arouse no antagonism whatsoever.
It is therefore necessary that the citizen understand that the cameras
placed so as to view the public streets and those areas open to public use
will in no way diminish the freedom of legal action or place constraints
on normal conduct. The camera, in short, will see no more than would
a police officer patrolling either on foot or in car. There will, however, be
the advantage of persistence in maintaining observation of a public prob-
lem area.
An officer at police headquarters, viewing a series of monitors, will be
in a position to dispatch officers rapidly to a location of need. The
potentiality for safer communities can thus be increased greatly without
a constant increase in police manpower and consequent heavier tax
burden.
Nor is true freedom or essential privacy invaded. Freedom is not the
right to prey unobserved on others. The right to rob, rape, mug, or steal,
unobserved by a camera, is not such a freedom contemplated by the
framers of our constitution.
There still exists, it is true, some feeling that police officers should
not be permitted to make arrests unless in uniform, and driving a black
and white car. This is sometimes referred to as "the fair play concept"
and is usually limited in the public mind to those offenses regarded as
regulatory and not criminal. Few persons would argue that a plainclothes
detective should cough discreetly before arresting a burgular.
There is also a belief that unseemly conduct or indiscreet acts which
occur on public streets or in the public way will be publicly disclosed or
perhaps be improperly used by the police. The only thing that may be
said additionally in response to such feelings or expressed attitudes is
this: Police departments have for years had information entrusted to their
care of the most delicate and confidential nature.. They have been required
to settle domestic disputes and arbitrate family problems. They have
been required to decide when an arrest should be made and when it should
not. The police are in the employment of the citizens they serve and under
the direction of the persons representing the electorate. In Newport Beach
these representatives are your city council and television cameras will not
change this fact.
NEWPORT BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT
